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 '[W]hile the state's efforts [at regulating domestic work] assumed paid domestic work is a form of work like any 
other, and could therefore be formalized and depersonalized like any other, domestic workers are not workers 
like any other. Domestic workers' workplaces are not impersonal organizations that can be easily regulated 
through a depersonalized industrial relations system. Instead, domestic workers' workplaces are the intimate 
spaces of family life, and with their work goes all the close, personal contact, emotions, experiences and 
intimacy that is the fabric of families and households.' 1 
 
 
Introduction 
On 15 June 2010 the 99th session of the International Labour Conference (ILC) adopted 
proposals for a convention, supplemented by a recommendation, on decent work for 
domestic workers. From this has emanated a draft convention and recommendation, to be 
debated by member states and representative organizations of employers and workers 
around the world, from which proposed amendments will emerge. Once adopted by the ILC 
in 2011, a convention will require ratifying member states to formulate and implement laws 
or other measures to provide domestic workers with the stipulated protection. 
This marks a historic moment. Domestic work remains excluded 
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from the ambit of employment legislation in many countries. 2   The rationale for such 
exclusion tends to be the 'private' nature of domestic work, supposedly rendering it 
inappropriate for legal regulation. At the same time domestic workers in many countries 
have suffered, and continue to suffer, extreme forms of exploitation and abuse. 3   
Domestic work, the ILO Report notes, 'is rooted in the global history of slavery, colonialism 
and other forms of servitude'. 4   In general it is 'undervalued and poorly regulated, and 
many domestic workers remain overworked, underpaid and unprotected. Accounts of 
maltreatment and abuse, especially of live-in and migrant domestic workers, are regularly 
denounced in the media. In many countries, domestic work is very largely performed by 
child labourers'. 5 
Within the privacy of the home, however, it is possible for such practices to be carried on 
undetected and undisturbed by the intrusion of labour inspectors. 
Migrant domestic workers, the ILO Report adds, are particularly vulnerable to 'forced labour, 
slavery and slave-like conditions, and human trafficking'. 6   The danger of abuse increases 
exponentially where women are driven by poverty or persecution to seek employment in 
other countries despite being unable to satisfy immigration requirements - in other words, 
as undocumented or 'illegal' migrants. 7   Their undocumented status may disqualify or 
discourage 
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them from seeking legal protection, thus allowing their abuse to continue unabated. 
A second defining feature of domestic work is the fact that it is done overwhelmingly by 
women. For millions of women it is practically the only port of entry to the world of paid 
employment. However, it also exposes them to all the forms of discrimination, including 
harassment, to which women workers in general (especially in small or isolated workplaces) 
are exposed. In many countries, moreover, inequality on lines of class (that is, between 
employer and employee) and gender is further reinforced by racial hierarchy. Not 
surprisingly, this was starkly pronounced in apartheid South Africa where white 'madams' 
and black 'maids' inhabited different worlds and the domestic employment relationship, 
while liberating for the (e) employer, frequently involved the oppression of the (e) worker. 8   
Though apartheid has been gone for the better part of two decades, its legacy of inequality 
has yet to be overcome. 9 
And yet, despite the subordinate status assigned to it, domestic work is essential to the 
functioning of the global economy in that it enables millions of (mainly female) employees 
and self-employed persons, who might otherwise have been prevented by domestic 
responsibilities from doing so, to participate in the formal economy. The ILO Report 
observes: 
 'In contemporary society, care work at home is vital for the economy outside the household to function. In the 
past two decades demand for care work has been on the rise everywhere. The massive incorporation of women 
in the labour force, the ageing of societies, the intensification of work and the frequent lack or inadequacy of 
policy measures to facilitate the reconciliation of family life and work underpin this trend.' 10 
The final sentence hints at a more fundamental question underlying the issue of paid 
domestic work. In South Africa, as in much of the 
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world, 'responsibility for, and provision of, care is deferred to families and - because of the 
private patriarchies within households - to women'. 11   In the debate surrounding this 
deeply ingrained form of gender inequality, a case has been made out for the 'socialization' 
of domestic care 12   as a paradigm for policy development. The present article will not 
attempt to enter this debate, except in assuming that any new policies or legislation that 
may be formulated to address the conditions of domestic workers in South Africa or 
internationally should not proceed from the assumption that domestic work must remain 
'women's work', whether paid or unpaid. On the contrary, it is assumed that, certainly in 
South Africa, the time has come to start exploring ways in which the constitutional 
responsibilities of government and the state - inter alia, to provide access to 'social security' 
and 'appropriate social assistance' 13   - can be deployed in overcoming barriers to 
emancipation in this sector. 
 
 
The Right to Equality 
In constitutional terms, it is submitted, the starting-point in conceptualizing the regulation 
of domestic work is not simply the right to fair labour practices 14   but, more 
fundamentally, the right to equality. 15   This is not to assert a disjuncture between these 
two rights; equality is a foundational value which suffuses the Bill of Rights, in accordance 
with which all basic rights, including the right to fair labour practices, must be understood. 
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16   The argument is rather that the exploitation and abuse experienced by workers in this 
sector do not have their origin merely in shortcomings in the legislation by which the right 
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to fair labour practices is regulated. 17   Although such shortcomings do exist - as 
discussed below - they form part of a ubiquitous range of deficiencies experienced by 
domestic workers in the implementation of various basic rights 18   which, taken together, 
call into question their enjoyment of the right to equality itself. 
This statement needs to be unpacked. It should be recalled that, in South Africa, the right 
to equality is formulated in a substantive and not merely in a formal sense. Section 9(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution read as follows: 
 '(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
 '(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement 
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.' 19 
Labour law is ultimately about the right to substantive equality. It is premised on the fact 
that, while all citizens formally enjoy the same rights and freedoms in a democratic state, 
workers and employers are typically in an unequal relationship. This is captured in 
Kahn-Freund's famous statement that - 
 'the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between a bearer 
of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a 
condition of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that 
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the "contract of employment". 20 
To the extent that a contractual relationship implies a bargain struck between equals, in 
other words, the traditional conceptualization of the employment relationship as one based 
on contract is misleading. Although - like contracts in general - it is determined by 
bargaining power, the limited bargaining power of most workers historically meant that 
terms and conditions of employment were, in general, dictated by employers. Since paid 
employment is the basis of survival for most people in modern society, the power imbalance 
in employment relations readily translated into socio-economic inequality, often in the form 
of extremes of poverty and wealth. Against this background, according to Kahn-Freund, the 
role of labour law is to create 'equilibrium' between employers and workers. It does so, first 
and 
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foremost, by seeking to '[ensure] the effective operation of a voluntary system of collective 
bargaining'; this is said to be its 'central purpose'. 21   What workers cannot accomplish 
individually, in other words, they may accomplish collectively. Freedom of association and 
trade union organization should therefore place them in a stronger bargaining position 
vis-à-vis employers and secure their socio-economic position as citizens of democratic 
states. 
In practice, as we know, it has never been that simple. For one thing, trade union 
organization could never match the socio-economic power of employers, particularly as they 
evolved into transnational corporations; 22   rather, it might be said, the consequences of 
inequality were brought within bounds that were considered permissible in societies based 
on private enterprise and the private acquisition of wealth. No less important for present 
purposes is the extent to which labour law, while formally treating all workers equally, also 
takes account of differences among different sections of the workforce. This question will be 
Copyright JUTA & Co (Pty) Ltd 
 
 
considered more fully below. The point to note here is that collective bargaining 
presupposes certain levels of trade union organization which, in practice, have mainly 
proved attainable by workers in 'standard' employment 23   and, in particular, by those 
employed in larger workplaces. 24   For this reason, given the de facto exclusion of workers 
in unorganized sectors from collective bargaining (at least in its traditional forms), labour 
law has furthermore recognized the need for the enactment of minimum conditions of 
employment to protect these more vulnerable categories of workers. Taken together, these 
measures may be seen as a step in the direction of substantive equality: to counter 
inequality, workers are provided with certain rights that are not applicable to employers. 
But do they go far enough? 
The remainder of the article will focus on the way in which these questions present 
themselves in South Africa and, more specifically, in relation to domestic workers. The 
Constitutional Court has reiterated that 'collective bargaining is based on the need for 
individual workers 
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to act in combination to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain effectively 
with employers'. 25   In respect of unorganized workers, the BCEA - amplified by SD7 in 
relation to domestic workers - creates a 'floor of rights' which employers are not permitted 
to undercut even if they have the power to do so. Labour law, it might be said, has done 
everything that is conventionally expected of it. The question, then, is why such vast 
substantive inequality between domestic workers and their employers continues to exist. 
 
 
Monitoring Legal Compliance in the Domestic Worker Sector 
In practice, the greatest single challenge to the effectiveness of protective legislation is the 
difficulty of monitoring compliance by employers. In South Africa, despite significant levels 
of compliance with key requirements of SD7, 26   levels of non-compliance have remained 
unacceptably high. 27   In a recent 'blitz' of 576 employers of domestic workers in the 
Western Cape, for example, the Department of Labour found that only 42% complied with 
all relevant requirements. 28   The picture appears to be that, while significant numbers of 
employers do comply with the law to a greater or lesser degree, many are able to disregard 
it with relative impunity. 
Although the factors influencing compliance and non-compliance are complex, 29   part of 
the problem may lie in the extent to which 'compliance' is equated with 'enforcement'. The 
principal mechanism for promoting compliance in terms of the BCEA and SD7 is inspection 
of workplaces by labour inspectors with extensive powers of investigation and enforcement, 
including the power to issue compliance orders. 30   Given that the workplace of a domestic 
worker is also 
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the employer's residence, however, inspectors may only enter with the consent of the owner 
or occupier or if authorized by the Labour Court. 31   Much criticism has been directed at 
this limitation of the power of entry, which is seen as a barrier to the enforcement of 
compliance with SD7. 32   In fact, there is no clear evidence of this. 33   Even with 
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untrammelled powers of entry, moreover, it would be physically impossible for fewer than a 
thousand labour inspectors countrywide 34   to keep an adequate check on approximately 
one million residences where domestic workers are employed 35   in addition to monitoring 
compliance with some 20 other pieces of employment and labour legislation. These facts 
alone illustrate that inspection, while suited to a complaints-driven role, is hardly 
appropriate for creating a climate of compliance in a sector such as this. 
However, it is not only a question of logistics. Even in the formal sector, with relatively large 
and accessible workplaces, inspection does not serve as a general means of enforcement. In 
general, a trade union presence in the workplace is a far more effective mechanism for 
monitoring legal compliance and, if necessary, invoking enforcement procedures. 36   In 
the domestic sector the picture is infinitely more problematic. Even though it is certainly 
possible for domestic workers to be mobilized and organized, 37   the nature of the sector 
does not lend 
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itself to trade union organization in its traditional forms. In particular, there is little 
possibility of establishing an effective trade union presence to monitor compliance at 
household level. To a far greater extent than in the formal sector, monitoring compliance by 
employers cannot be separated from the empowerment of individual domestic workers, not 
only in terms of knowledge of their legal rights but also in terms of ability to take 
appropriate action in the event of non-compliance. 
This proposition takes us back to the issue of equality. Inequality translates into 
disempowerment, while the realization of substantive equality is difficult to separate from 
empowerment and greater ability to engage with employers. In this sense, extending the 
reach of labour law in the sector through the empowerment of domestic workers is integral 
to giving substance to their right to equality, and vice versa. Ensuring compliance cannot 
succeed as a project driven by external actors, whether in the shape of the Department of 
Labour or organizations not rooted among domestic workers themselves. 38   It is 
inseparable from the participation of the workers as independent actors. 
Two practical examples will help to illustrate the distinction that is being drawn. 
The drafting of sectoral determinations and the review of minimum wages 
Prior to the promulgation of a sectoral determination, the Director-General of Labour is 
required to carry out an investigation of the sector in question and submit a report to the 
Employment Conditions Commission, which must then make recommendations to the 
Minister of Labour on 'the matters which should be included in a sectoral determination for 
the relevant sector and area'. 39   The minister may, but is not obliged to, '[invite] written 
representations by members of the public'. 40   In the case of SD7, in fact, an extensive 
consultative exercise took place, involving 64 public hearings, 114 written representations, 
two surveys covering over 300 employers and 4,000 domestic workers, a study of the 
international context and an economic analysis. 41   Despite this, trade unionists 
representing domestic workers insist that domestic workers were insufficiently involved in 
the process and that the outcomes - especially the legislated minimum wage levels - were 
disappointing. 
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Though at first sight the criticism may appear surprising, it will be noted that the views of 
domestic workers were solicited as part of an information gathering process, together with 
the views of other interested parties and of the public in general, rather than a dialogue 
involving workers and employers as the parties directly concerned. The final decisions, 
moreover, were taken by the Department of Labour without further reference to the parties. 
Domestic workers had no greater ownership of the process than did any other section of the 
public, and it did little to empower them. Whatever the merits of SD7, an opportunity to 
make domestic workers custodians of their own rights, and thereby reinforce their right to 
equality, was lost. 
For as long as there are no sufficiently representative trade unions and employers' 
organizations in the domestic worker sector capable of engaging in collective bargaining, it 
must be accepted that sectoral determinations and annual revisions thereof will remain 
necessary for regulating minimum conditions of employment. Nothing, however, prevents 
the Department of Labour from more actively seeking to involve representatives of domestic 
workers, especially trade unions, together with organizations representing the interests of 
employers, in a process of negotiation to help shape amendments to SD7. The domestic 
worker forums currently being established by the Department of Labour on a provincial 
basis create a framework within which dialogue of this nature could potentially be launched. 
42   Though the outcome of such dialogue would not be a collective agreement, would have 
no legal consequences and would not preclude the minister from seeking the views of other 
roleplayers, it would provide a clearer indication of terms and conditions which organizations 
articulating views of workers and employers could agree on and advocate among their 
constituencies. Above all, it would give domestic workers greater ownership of the outcomes 
and, by engaging workers on a basis of equality with their employers, is likely to be an 
empowering experience. 
Involving domestic workers in labour inspections 
Section 68(1) of the BCEA states that a labour inspector may set the enforcement process 
in motion if he or she has 'reasonable grounds to believe that an employer has not complied 
with any provision of this 
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Act'. This implies that an objective investigation must take place which, according to the 
rules of natural justice, requires both the employer and the worker to be heard. Yet, 
surprisingly, there appear to be cases where labour inspectors seek information only from 
employers when carrying out random inspections, or 'blitzes', at households where domestic 
workers are employed. 43   This can only be seen as privileging the employer as a source of 
information on issues where, in terms of the purposes of BCEA and SD7, the worker's 
interests should be paramount. It may also lead workers to believe that, should they lodge 
a complaint, it may likewise result in a conversation between the inspector and the 
employer from which the worker is excluded and where the employer's version of events will 
be accepted as the truth. 44 
In an approach prioritizing the empowerment of domestic workers, it is submitted, 
inspectors should in all cases seek to involve domestic workers as far as possible. This 
seems implicit in their primary function of seeking to 'promote' (rather than 'enforce') 
compliance, in the first place by 'advising employees and employers of their rights and 
obligations'. 45   The obvious objection - that workers may be reluctant to speak out in the 
presence of their employers - should be seen as reinforcing the need for such an approach 
rather than contradicting it; for, if workers are indeed reluctant, it should serve as a 
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warning signal that they fear victimization 46   or, at best, that the relationship between 
employer and workers is not conducive to compliance. The delicate balance between legal 
and personal dimensions that presents itself here will be discussed below. Suffice it to 
suggest that, in such cases, inspectors could play a constructive role in 'mediating' between 
the parties with a view to promoting a mutual understanding of what the law requires and, 
very importantly, its objective of supporting the development of their relationship in line 
with constitutional values rather than 'dictating' what they must do. Such a process would 
provide a basis for the parties to find their own solutions to any problems there may be 
while, at the same time, narrowing the gulf of inequality between them. 
Significantly, the Western Cape Provincial Report 47   accepts that '[t]he majority of the 
employers regard the employment relationship as very informal and conditions of 
employment are normally based on 
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verbal discussions and agreements which [are] based on trust and honesty'. If this is so, 
there is no reason to assume that compliance with the letter and spirit of the law, properly 
understood, would necessarily be resisted. Indeed, respect for domestic workers' right to 
equality, dignity and fair labour practices would be enormously conducive to genuine 'trust' 
between the parties. Encouraging the development of such respect, it is submitted, is at the 
very core of the functions of labour inspectors. 
 
 
Implications of the 'Intimate' Nature of Domestic Work 
Most commentaries on domestic work note its 'private' or 'intimate' nature and, correctly, 
see this as crucial in explaining the exploitative treatment to which domestic workers are 
frequently exposed. As Shireen Ally's study shows, however, there is more to it than this. 48   
A clue is provided by the fact that not all domestic employment relationships are 
exploitative; even though domestic workers have limited access to legal protection, some 
have managed to negotiate working conditions which they themselves consider satisfactory 
or good. To ascribe this simply to the benevolence of the employer would be misleading; in 
many cases the workers' own management of the relationship has much to do with it. The 
'vulnerable' nature of domestic employment, in other words, does not translate simply into 
'victimhood'. Domestic workers are persons who, like others, develop coping mechanisms 
and strategies for managing difficult circumstances. The absence of trade union organization 
in the workplace, combined with the de facto absence of effective mechanisms of 
day-to-day protection by the state, 49   compels them to rely on their own informal 
networks and resources in protecting themselves and, in so doing, asserting their right to 
equality and dignity. 
To say this raises echoes of the law of contract: and it is true that, in an informal sense, 
domestic workers and their employers may well negotiate various terms and conditions of 
employment - for example, time off for personal reasons, or limits to the worker's job 
description - by their conduct as much as their words. Workers are, furthermore, fortified by 
informal networks, by the sharing of experience and the support of other workers in their 
vicinity. The pervasive inequality between employer and worker does, of course, place limits 
on what can be achieved through the subtle exercise of pressure and, in the face of 
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employer intransigence, is likely to prove ineffective. Such 'intimate' forms of power play 
do, however, form an ongoing reality 
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and a possible point of support for appropriate regulation under the circumstances of this 
sector. 
It is important to note that the informal assertion of workers' power in these ways is by no 
means peculiar to the domestic worker sector. Preceding collective bargaining, and 
continuing to exist side by side with formal rules and managerial power in most if not all 
workplaces, is what Clegg has termed 'worker regulation'. 50   By this is meant the 
numerous ways, often unique to each workplace, in which workers individually and 
collectively 'interpret' their rights and duties, which may come to be accepted by 
management, tacitly or expressly, in the shape of unwritten rules or 'custom and practice' 
which may or may not become incorporated in collective agreements or legislation. In this 
respect the domestic worker sector is fundamentally no different from any other sector; all 
that differs is the relative importance of informal regulation in the de facto absence of 
formal regulation. Here, to a greater extent than in more formal and impersonal sectors, 
actual regulation takes place through the exercise of employer power mediated to a limited 
but appreciable extent by 'worker regulation'. 51   But for this, the employer's domination 
would be practically äcomplete. 
State policy, however, takes little cognizance of this hidden dimension of the domestic 
employment relationship. Although there are some notable exceptions, 52   Ally argues that 
state policy in general proceeds from the 'helplessness' of 'vulnerable' workers and the need 
to 'protect' rather than to empower them. To this extent, the duty of the state to uphold 
domestic workers' rights translates into a 'paternalistic' role of seeking to enforce those 
rights (for example, by publishing sectoral determinations or through the intervention of 
labour inspectors) on behalf of 'victims' who are incapable of representing themselves. 53   
There can be no doubt that the efforts of the Department of Labour are motivated by a 
desire to improve the conditions of domestic workers and have had various positive 
outcomes, not least an increase in real wages. 54   Nevertheless, to the extent that workers 
are 
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not involved in defending their own rights, it is problematic. In seeking to act on the 
workers' behalf (even though it is obliged by s 23(1) of the Constitution to strike an 
impartial balance between employers and workers), Ally argues, the state is substituting 
itself for the organization that the workers might otherwise have felt the need to build. It 
thus becomes a self-perpetuating dynamic: the harder it is for domestic workers to rely on 
labour rights designed for the standard workplace, the more the state sets out to implement 
those rights on their behalf. That this is ultimately disempowering rather than empowering, 
weakening rather than reinforcing workers in asserting their right to equality will be evident. 
The state's conception of its responsibility, Ally goes on to suggest, is problematic not only 
in failing to recognize these tenuous manifestations of domestic workers' self-assertion but 
in actually, albeit inadvertently, undermining them. Bringing the blunt instrument of the law 
to bear on a delicately balanced relationship, in circumstances where the state is unable to 
ensure ongoing enforcement, could mean the destruction of the self-protection which the 
worker has attempted to negotiate while providing little or nothing in its place. 55   The 
unintended consequence may be to alienate workers from the very law that was designed to 
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protect them. 56   Commenting on various instances where workers declined to make use 
of their rights, Ally explains it as follows: 
 '[C]onfronted with the irreconcilable confrontation between disembodied rights and embodied intimacy, 
domestic workers consciously disowned the more disabling and subjectifying aspects of democratic statecraft.' 
57 
Only in one respect does the law, somewhat ironically, acknowledge the intimate nature of 
the domestic employment relationship: it denies trade union representatives or officials 
access to the workplace of a domestic worker except with the employer's consent 58   and, 
as already noted, similarly restricts access by labour inspectors. 59   It is 
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suggested that this one-sided recognition should be developed into a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship as a whole, with the emphasis on formulating measures 
for promoting compliance that will at the same time empower workers, build on their ability 
to manage their work situations and give content to their right to equality. 
The principle of substantive rather than formal equality, as discussed above, has a practical 
meaning which is crucial in guiding this process. Treating domestic workers as 'workers like 
all others' reflects an overly formal conception of equality; the theme of this article is the 
need to move beyond this and find ways of promoting substantive equality in this sector. In 
Botha & another v Mthiyane & another 60   the implication of such an approach was 
explained as follows: 
 'Equality is not simply a matter of likeness. It is, equally, a matter of difference. That those who are different 
should be differently treated is as vital to equality as is the requirement that those who are like are treated 
alike. In certain cases it is the very essence of equality to make distinctions between groups and individuals in 
order to accommodate their different needs and interests.' 
The true purpose of labour law in South Africa, it may be concluded, is to treat all workers 
in such a way that they are able to enjoy the rights and freedoms contemplated by the Bill 
of Rights as fully as possible. Where workers are differently situated, it is necessary to treat 
them differently in order to ensure substantively equal access to those rights and freedoms. 
The present exercise is essentially about identifying ways in which domestic workers need to 
be treated differently. The disparities between the conditions of domestic work and those of 
'standard' employment thus emerge not merely as an explanation for the disadvantages 
suffered by domestic workers, but as indicators of the kinds of remedial measures that are 
called for in promoting substantive equality in this sector. 
 
 
Conclusion 
South Africa has gone further than in many other states in protecting the rights of workers. 
In the case of domestic workers, the rights extended by the various labour statutes and by 
SD7 go beyond the minimum which an ILO convention is likely to call for. This article does 
not question the purposes of these statutes nor the determination of the Department of 
Labour to implement them. Rather, it suggests that the steps that have been taken from 
formal equality (treating all workers alike) towards substantive equality (taking account of 
the unique circumstances of domestic work) do not go far enough. The argument is that the 
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focus of all law regulating domestic work, as well as policy measures deployed in the sector 
(for example, training 
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programmes), should be to reduce the degree of inequality between domestic workers and 
their employers. To this end the forms in which various rights are extended to domestic 
workers should be critically re-examined and, if necessary, reformulated with a view to 
ensuring the full enjoyment of those rights. Throughout this process the aim should be to 
empower domestic workers in the actual situation in which they find themselves - that is, 
seeking to assert their rights and negotiate conditions in a one-to-one relationship with 
more powerful employers. 61   For, it has been argued, it is only when employers come to 
see domestic workers as persons possessing an equal right to dignity that the right to fair 
labour practices in all its legal forms will be placed on firm foundations. 
In pursuing these objectives, a number of propositions emerging expressly or implicitly from 
the discussion thus far are put forward for consideration: 
 (a) The organization of domestic workers is not only possible but essential in order to 
share experience and knowledge, provide collective support, exercise collective 
pressure and, generally, fortify workers in asserting their right to equal treatment 
and fair labour practices. Given that domestic workers are not concentrated in large 
workplaces, however, organization cannot take the form of traditional trade 
unionism but is likely to be more viable in forms referred to as 'social movement' 
unionism - that is, combining organization in the workplace or around workplace 
issues with organization around broader social issues relevant to workers' 
conditions of employment. 62 
 (b) Collective bargaining in the domestic worker sector will be dependent on the 
emergence of organizations representative of employers as well as workers. This, 
however, should not prevent the involvement of organizations of domestic workers 
in negotiating the content of sectoral determinations applicable to the sector and 
annual minimum wage revisions - a process which 
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  could be empowering while also narrowing the distance between domestic workers 
and workers in organized sectors. 
 (c) The impossibility of policing up to a million domestic workplaces by means of 
inspection calls for greater emphasis by the Department of Labour on promoting 
rather than enforcing compliance - that is, by developing strategies for engaging 
with workers and employers more broadly with a view to developing a common 
understanding of legal requirements, mediating differences and encouraging parties 
to arrive at their own arrangements for compliance with the law. Provincial 
domestic worker forums offer a platform for launching such processes as well as 
(informal) negotiations around annual minimum wage revisions. 
 (d) A model contract of employment could be designed, taking into account the unique 
realities of the domestic employment relationship and creating space for 
self-regulation - for example, to accommodate the requirements of the worker's 
family life. The current duty placed on the employer to provide the worker with 
written particulars of employment, 63   while intended to curb the arbitrary 
exercise of power by employers, does not prevent the employer from determining 
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those conditions unilaterally. It is suggested that the current 'Sample of written 
particulars' provided by the Department of Labour 64   should be revised to 
embody an agreement between the parties along the lines proposed above. 65 
 (e) The promotion of domestic workers' right to equality implies giving recognition to 
their individuality and personal achievements, inter alia, by replacing the existing 
uniform minimum wage, premised on a universal lack of skill, with appropriate 
wage differentials based on differences in education, skill and experience. Skills 
development and training, including the development of generic skills that would 
enable domestic workers to 
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  find employment in other sectors, should be systematically undertaken and linked 
to appropriate levels of remuneration comparable to those in other sectors. 66   
Inequality between workers and employers is likely to be narrowed if their skills are 
formally and appropriately acknowledged. 
 (f) The fundamental argument has been that the burden of inequality experienced by 
domestic workers creates an insuperable barrier to the 'full enjoyment' of their 
rights. Such inequality, however, is not confined to shortcomings in the 
implementation of the right to fair labour practices. The re-examination of laws 
applicable to domestic workers should therefore not be limited to SD7 and other 
pieces of labour legislation. To address the right to equality in all its dimensions it 
will be necessary to interrogate the impact of all relevant legal provisions, including 
relevant provisions of private and public law, to ensure that the disadvantages 
imposed on domestic workers are removed to the greatest possible extent. 
Similar questions, it is submitted, should be considered in relation to other spheres of 
informal or non-standard employment where existing labour law may find limited 
application. 
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